PhaenEx presupposes belonging to a linguistic community, the shibboleth, in Jacques Derrida's words (from his commentary on Celan's poem), grants one "the right of asylum or the legitimate habitation of a language … indeed, the right to live" (Sovereignties 26) . 1 Yet the shibboleth of the mother tongue is a double-edged sword: it can become a sentence of exclusion, even a death sentence, as it befell the Ephraimites, but also (later in history), the Eastern European community of the speakers of Yiddish.
The events of the Holocaust excluded Celan and many others like him-strangers who speak in a "circumcised word"-from the human community (Celan 171) . As a result, the genre of Holocaust testimony, of which Celan's poetry is an example-the writing of the disaster that proliferated in the decades after the war-is also testimony to the vicissitudes of translation. In what follows, I will argue that, at least within the purview of Holocaust témoignage, though by no means circumscribed by it, translation is imbued with an ethical demand and must be reevaluated in the context of ethics. Or, insofar as translation bears witness to the inscription of alterity in the language of a community, the visitation of the stranger who has arrived from "planet Auschwitz," the sounds of his or her voice, wounded and often marked with an accent, situates translation as always already an ethics.
I will reflect on translation's ethical exigency after the Shoah in relation to Emmanuel
Levinas' hyperbolic articulation of ethics as responsibility to and for the other. At the same time, I will pose a question about the place of translation in Levinas' own work, despite the philosopher's ostensive silence on the subject. "Translation" will be understood in a broad sense as both rendering a text into another language, and as exchanges and interactions between languages that take place within a given a text. Holocaust testimony is a case par excellence of the dilemmas of translation because of its paradigmatic condition of linguistic dislocation, as it gestures also include speech acts; language thus carries traces of trauma, often against the subject's intention or will. In many instances of Holocaust testimony, the disjunction between language and the experience it is seeking to describe is magnified because bearing witness to what happened takes place in a foreign tongue. The psychoanalytic cure involves working through the traumatic event and eventually domesticating it in language, even though this language remains radically foreign to what it is trying to describe. In that case, what happens in the passage between the linguistic environment in which trauma was (not) experienced and the survivor's second language, in which testimony is given?
Undoubtedly, the relation between trauma and language is relevant to Levinas' oeuvre, at least insofar as we interpret his work as underwritten by the imperative to bear witness to the Shoah, to "the hatred of the other man," in the medium of philosophy, although its testimonial scope must not be reduced to this particular historical trauma (epigraph to Otherwise than Being). In Philippe Nemo's words, the Holocaust was "a hidden referent" around which Levinas' work was organized (quoted in Malka xi), while Howard Caygill proposes that both Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being (1974) are veiled "works of mourning for the victims of National Socialism" (Caygill 5) , and Michaël de Saint Charon claims that Levinas' lifelong work on developing an ethics of infinite responsibility was meant to be a "justification of living after Auschwitz" (de Saint Cheron xi). 2 Levinas' life and work were marked by the tragic events of the Shoah, although in his major works he remained silent on the subject. Direct-if undeveloped-references appear in shorter texts, such as "The Struthof Case," "The Name of the Dog, or Natural Rights," "Nameless," or "Useless Suffering," and perhaps most notably in a brief text at the end of Difficult Freedom, entitled "Signature," where Levinas concludes a summary of his "intellectual biography" with a statement that "It [his work] is dominated by the presentiment and the memory of the Nazi horror" (291). In his essay, "Loving the Torah more than God," an unusual text for the philosopher since it was a review of a work of fiction (the Holocaust-inspired novella "Yosl Rakover Speaks to God," by Israeli writer Zvi Kolitz), Levinas explains that his reluctance to write about the Shoah stems from a refusal "to offer up the ultimate passion as a spectacle and to use these inhuman screams to create a halo for myself as either author or director. The cries are inextinguishable; they echo and echo across eternity.
What we must do is listen to the thought they contain" ("Loving the Torah" 81, emphasis mine).
Thus, although Levinas questions appropriative thematization of horror and suffering, he also emphasizes that the impact of the events is enduring and insists that his task as a thinker "after Auschwitz" is to listen to the cries of the victims.
We must note, however, that the philosopher's life and work were also affected by linguistic and geographical migrations: he was a Lithuanian Jew, raised in a Russian and Yiddish speaking household. When he moved to France in 1923 to pursue his studies at Strasbourg, he adopted French as the language in which he subsequently wrote all of his work. In the Foreword to Malka's biography of Levinas, Philippe Nemo writes that after Levinas came to live in France, he made "an unwavering rational and spiritual decision" to be loyal to that country, and this observation can surely be extended to Levinas' "loyalty" to the French language (Malka vii).
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Unlike Hannah Arendt, who often spoke with fondness about her native German and her conscious effort to preserve it, 4 or Celan, whose poetry plumbs the tortured paradoxes of his relation to his Muttersprache (which also became for him the language of barbarism and "the thousand darknesses of deathbringing speech"), Levinas never commented on the role of his native tongue in his work (Celan 395 Although French was his language of everyday use, in this second language "he will always stumble around as if I were drunk" (Améry 48). French would never become "a real friend": "La In Otherwise Than Being, Levinas argues that language is primarily constituted by the self's aptitude to respond to the call of the other, and he distinguishes between language as the preoriginal, ethical Saying that signifies as a one for the other, and language as the Said that merely communicates meaning and betrays alterity by bringing it into disclosure. He writes, "The responsibility for another is precisely a saying prior to anything said. The surprising saying, which is a responsibility for another is against 'the winds and tides' of being, is an interruption of essence" (43). While language "as a thematization and an identification in which being is as it were set" is impersonal and belongs to the order of truth and being, its ethical essence is the proximity of the interlocutor, a contact between me and the absolute singularity of the other, "tenderness and responsibility" (Levinas, "Language and Proximity" 116).
In the seminal chapter of Otherwise Than Being, entitled "Substitution," Levinas relates his reflection on Saying and the Said to a conception of the ethical subject whose primordial, pre-ontological condition is displacement from "home," a violent eviction from chez soi, Yet even in this rare autobiographical moment, which can be seen as a symbolic textual matzevah for his murdered relatives, Levinas chooses Hebrew rather than his mother tongue Russian, or Yiddish, the languages spoken by those whose names he commemorates. Here, the absoluteness of Levinas' silence about Russian and Yiddish, or, should we say, his silence in Russian and Yiddish, betokens the unspeakable loss of those who spoke those languages and who were "closest" to the philosopher.
Levinas' silence, which envelops the place in which the closest to him were murdered, partakes therefore of the landscape of linguistic devastation after the war. what is now known as La Nuit, a translatory feat that enabled him to emerge from traumatized silence and craft his entire life as a paradigmatic witness to the Shoah. 6 As mentioned before, a majority of survivors from Eastern Europe eventually wrote their memoirs or gave oral testimony in their second language, and the choice of the language in which they wrote had an impact on their strategies of self-identification, including the content of their memory. Some scholars who have interviewed survivors claim that the truth of the traumatic experience can only be expressed in the language in which it happened. 7 Others report that, exactly because the "truth" of the experience is so strongly associated with one's native tongue, a neutral, distant language can act as a protective shield, thus enabling the survivor to break the silence. As Dorota Glowacka
Holocaust historian and writer Yaffa Eliach notes, "Sometimes the language stands between the writer and the horrors of the Holocaust, in that it permits him to grapple with the Holocaust in a language other than that in which he experienced it. Consciously, or perhaps unconsciously, the new language has the power to attenuate slightly the fiery pain" (quoted in Rosen 11) . Thus, by refracting memory through translation, authors of Holocaust testimonies abdicate the "truth" of traumatic events and allow their new linguistic medium to expropriate it. At the same time, the second language has an amnesiac, palliative effect, which allows them to master the fragmented, uncontainable experience.
Kertész, Holocaust survivor and Nobel Prize laureate, once said that he writes about the Holocaust because it "does not have a language"; that is, no national language has been able to coin the words that would contain its experience (Kertész 204) . Because of national languages' fundamental incapacity for expression vis à vis the Holocaust, the survivor dwells as a stranger in the "house of language," being only able to express himself in an accidental, "borrowed tongue, which in its nature rejects [him] or only tolerates [his] presence on the peripheries of its consciousness" (204, translation mine). The "unclaimed experience" (Caruth's term) of the Shoah is extraterritorial with respect to national languages, although in the accented speech of the survivors its symptoms return as the lost language's unassimilable remainder. We have stated that Levinas' entire philosophical project is a protestation against the violence directed at another man, unleashed by the Shoah. In his post-Auschwitz reflection The Drowned and the Saved Primo Levi writes, "It is an obvious assertion that where violence is inflicted on men, it is also inflicted on language," that "necessary and sufficient instrument for man to be man" (Levi 97 ).
The precarious condition of post-Holocaust language stems directly from the Nazi assault on the essence of man as zōon logon echōn. Yet this violence was manifested in an attempt to exterminate particular national languages, through a decree that those who spoke them should die. Thus the conundrum of post-Holocaust speech lies in the imperative, now incumbent on survivors, to translate into a national tongue the experience of the annihilation of his or her intrinsically human ability to address another and to be addressed. In that case, would the way out of this aporia lie in a search for a translinguistic horizon that would transcend the manifestation of testimony in a national tongue? It can be argued that this linguistic perplexity Echoing the cabbalistic legend of the vessel in which angels carried divine light until it became too heavy, fell, and shattered into millions of pieces, the prelapsarian pure language is the "inaccessible realm of reconciliation and fulfillment between languages," in which the fragments scattered and abandoned across different languages are to be gathered and rejoined (Benjamin, Illuminations 75). This means that languages are a priori interrelated by a "weak" messianic promise, and translation can bring out their higher kinship. Every language then possesses an inherent quality of translatability, regardless of whether a person will ever be found capable of translating it. In its promise of communicability between languages, an actual work of translation thus beckons toward the horizon of linguistic possibility-an unreachable limit to which every text is destined. In that sense, translation's "fidelity" to the original does not mean that it reproduces the original, but that it produces an effect of harmony and reflects "the great longing for linguistic complementation" (79). In reaching out toward pure language from within a particular language, translation always addresses itself to a wholly other tongue. Yet as Paul de language": the fact that exactly in the place where we feel most at home and familiar-in our mother tongue-"this alienation is the strongest" (de Man 84). And this is why, ever since Babel, languages are destined for translation; why, as Jacques Derrida writes in his essay on Benjamin, "Les Tours de Babel," the translator's task is a mission-"the commitment, the duty"-to reveal a language's originary indebtedness to what it has excluded (177). We do not know to whom the translator is obligated, but it is from the place of this inarticulable, untranslatable alterity inherent in every national language that a work calls for translation. This is why, as Benjamin writes, "the task of the translator is to release in his own language that pure language which is under the spell of another to liberate the language imprisoned in a work in his re-creation of the work" PhaenEx (Ethics and Infinity 110). Thus the ethical subject, affected by the other to the core of its being, testifies to the source of its own obligation, the source that is radically external, cannot be derived from consciousness, and remains unknown. The self, writes Levinas, is like a sound "that would resound in its own echo, the node of a wave which is not once again consciousness" Perhaps it is no coincidence therefore that the affinity of the idiom of witnessing in Levinas and Benjamin is reflected in both thinkers' recourse to the figure of the echo. Benjamin writes, "The task of the translator consists in finding that intended effect (Intention) upon the language into which he is translating which produces in it the echo of the original"
(Illuminations 76). Perched on the periphery of language, translation calls into the "language forest … it calls into it without entering, aiming at that single spot where the echo is able to give, in its own language, the reverberation of the work in the alien one" (76, emphasis mine).
Although it does not enter "the green valley" of my linguistic community (Celan 396) , translation striates my tongue with the traces of the foreign, whereby my own language, the hearth of my identity, suddenly becomes "alien" in its own home, unheimlich. The trope of the echo conveys that translation is a response to the summons from another language, the language of another. It reveals that my ability to speak, that is, my membership in a linguistic community, is constituted in the movement of returning home from an encounter with another tongue. On the other hand, the speech of an exile from the community calls for translation because it is testimony to a trace of strangeness sojourning in "the midst of the market."
For Levinas, self-identity arises from the impossibility of escaping ethical assignation; that is, responsibility is the primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity. As he elaborates in
Otherwise Than Being, the subject is individuated in "recurrence," a repeated movement of going outside of oneself and withdrawing into oneself, which is precipitated by encounters with a being that dwells outside the horizon of my world and, arriving from the "immemorial past," never coincides with me temporally ("The Trace of the Other" 353). In recurrence, the same substitutes for another "on the hither side of its own identity," putting itself in someone else's place to the point of being her hostage and expiating for her faults (Otherwise 139). Unlike in Hegelian recognition, where the encounter with the other culminates in the absorption of the non-identical, in recurrence, the ethical subject is turned toward the other who cannot be assimilated to the structures of the self. As a result, the endless movement of return from the outside disallows the subject to coincide with itself, disrupting self-presence and self-possession.
This repetitive mis-encounter with oneself is thus "an exigency coming from the other over and above the active dimension of my powers, so as to become a departure without limits in which the self spends itself without counting" (Levinas, God, Death, and Time 179) . The self is, first and foremost, for the other because prior to having ventured outside of itself, it has already returned from a (non)place of absolute exteriority, which it can never inhabit. Originating in recurrence as the infinite movement of primordial ethical obligation, the self is displaced and uncomfortable, "twisted over itself in its skin, too tight in its skin, in itself already outside of itself" (Otherwise 104). It loses the fulcrum of self-identification, unable to find itself chez soi:
"before the exigency of the other, the I is expelled from this rest, and is not the consciousness of this exile" ("The Trace" 353, emphasis mine). The ethical subject is evicted from its "place in the sun ... the beginning of all usurpations," and its Being-in-the world, its very right to be, is radically questioned (Pascal, frequently quoted by Levinas, Robbins 62).
Benjamin's thesis on "pure language" reveals that I come into being as a speaking Levinas calls the Said always appears in its concrete manifestation as a national language. In that sense, any act of translation is a double betrayal, effacing the very thing it seeks to preserve and
failing to deliver what it has been consigned to bring forth. We can then postulate that Levinas conceives of Saying as a moment that escapes both thematization in the Said and the totalizing intention of a particular tongue. At the same time, since my voice carries the trace of radical alterity and bears witness to it, the Said is necessary: I must not remain silent "be it at the price of a betrayal" (Otherwise 6). Furthermore, in language as it is ethically conceived, silence itself belongs to speech and signifies by its effacement of the communicating word. We can then say that Levinas' Said is a manifestation of the Benjaminian paradox of traduttore traditore-of any particular tongue's necessary failure (which, as de Man brings out, is also a felicitous one). We can postulate therefore that Levinas' articulation of Saying, as it always overflows the imperfect vessel of thematic language and undoes its form ("the inevitable paralysis of manifestation"), quietly echoes Benjamin's conception of "pure language"-the horizon of communicability between languages, toward which the text is solicited by a call from another tongue ("The Trace" 352). For Benjamin, the allegory of the Tower of Babel symbolizes the inferiority of the words with which man names things with respect to God's infinite word that speaks things into existence (Reflections 318). While Benjamin's attention to the plurality of Babel allows us to anchor Levinas' Saying in a particular linguistic community of the Said, Levinas' insistence on Saying's ethical orientation, which issues from the irreducible singularity of the other, re-situates Benjamin's translator face to face with a language user. It is as a suffering, vulnerable existent that a speaker of language walks in the trace of God ("The Trace" 359). PhaenEx
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The above reflection on Levinas' linguistic peregrinations, in the literal sense of exile and the crossing of national frontiers as well as in his reflection on language, has led me to a twopronged conclusion. In a larger framework, an approach to the question of translation in which
Levinas' thesis about the ethical essence of language is augmented with Benjamin's sensitivity to the plurality of languages might be the right step toward developing a theoretical framework in which to consider the dilemmas of translation in Holocaust testimony, which, with a few notable exceptions, have so far received little critical attention. 8 The specific weakness of Holocaust testimony-the absence of a language in which it nevertheless must be conveyed-makes it vulnerable to appropriation. Within the scope of Levinas' ethics, which I have expanded so that it can encompass the problem of translation, this weakness is also its greatest strength in at least two respects. As is apparent in many a Holocaust memoir, and mentioned here in reference to Levi and Kertész, Holocaust testimony foregrounds the communicative imperative and is structured as an address to another, demanding a response. In its plea, "Are you listening?" "Please listen!" its function is primarily phatic and ethical (rather than cognitive), and the speaking subject emerges as the inscription of the trace of the other, who addresses it from the past that is inaccessible in memory.
In his eulogy for Levinas, included in Adieu for Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida reminisces that when talking on the phone Levinas would frequently repeat "'Allô, allô' between each sentence, sometimes even in mid-sentence" in a voice strained with worry that the communication might have been interrupted (9) . This linguistic gesture is telling of Levinas' concern for the other's non-response, his solicitude for what he calls the expressive function of language-its "signifyingness of signification" that is primarily the turning of the ear toward the other, prior to the content and intention of the message. As he says in one of the interviews, "Should language [not] be thought ... perhaps above all-as the fact of encountering the other as other, that is to say, already as response to him? Is not the first word bonjour? ... I wish you peace, I wish you a good day, expression of one who worries for the other" (Robbins 47) . In this concern, Levinas' conception of language resonates with the plea to listen that structures every Holocaust testimony, with its primary function as interpellation.
Translation is then central to Holocaust testimony because, oriented toward an inaccessible region of linguistic complementarity, it is primarily an articulation of the hope of communication, of the tikkun (mending) of language, against the Nazi destruction of language as an address to another. 9 Its function is to initiate and sustain communication and to transmit a plea for a response. As we read in many survivor memoirs, in the Nazi camps the knowledge of German and one's translatory abilities were the prime mechanism of survival. Levi describes
Auschwitz as "a perpetual Babel, in which everyone shouts orders and threats in languages never heard before, and woe betide whoever fails to grasp the meaning" (Survival in Auschwitz 38). It is striking that, in many passages in both Levi and Kertész, being able to speak German but also the other languages of the camp is associated with nourishment, specifically with bread and soup.
Levi recalls, for instance, that he was absorbing foreign words and expressions "like a famished stomach rapidly assimilates even indigestible food," and he trades a daily portion of bread for a lesson of German, commenting that: "never was bread better spent." Survival depends on one's translating abilities and linguistic talents, which enable one to secure an extra slab of "bread- . When giving an apparently arbitrary example of languages' intention to communicate, Benjamin (like Levi) tellingly chooses the word for "bread," the symbol of nourishment and preservation of life: "the word Brot means something different to a German that the word pain to a Frenchman (Illuminations 74). Translators bear witness to that difference, and they do so by lending an ear to the other, by exposing themselves to the alien sounds that they make reverberate in their native tongue. In another convergence of metaphors, Levinas repeatedly tropes responsibility as giving to another the bread taken away from my mouth. Here, "bread" is the cipher for the ethical imperative that the preservation of the life of another is more important than my own life.
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Kertész asks, with respect to the question of language after the Shoah: "For whom is this language destined?" (181) According to Celan, a poem is "a message in a bottle, sent out in the-not always greatly hopeful-belief that somewhere and sometime it could wash up on land, on heartland perhaps" (396). It is a gift destined to an unknown future, and its hope "has always been to speak … in the cause of an Other-who knows, perhaps in the cause of a wholly Other"
(408, emphasis in original). Like Celan's poetic speech, the translating word drifts toward the unknown for the sake of an encounter, opening the door to the other who arrives from the future, and it is already marked by the accents of those to whom it is addressed. That is why the task of the translator is to interrupt a national language's complacency by disseminating the echoes of foreign word-visas without which linguistic borders would remain impassable. In the process, native words are transformed from an inscription of belonging into the mark of strangeness. Levinas construes Saying-an aptitude to listen with an ear always turned toward the other-as a translinguistic horizon, over and beyond its disclosure as a linguistic phenomenon. Saying, which signifies responsibility and marks my own speech with the trace of the other, can never be reduced to the Said, to that which, as Levinas does not say, always takes place in a particular national tongue. (69) Derrida concludes that the relation between translation and testimony is a necessary one, and it is maintained by this aporetic conundrum of testifying speech. It seems that a similar aporia bears upon Levinas' articulation of subjectivity as witness to the other and language as primarily Saying; moreover, it is inseparable from the dilemmas of translation that-silently-permeated his work and his life. In turn, insofar as testimony and translation are interrelated in their ethical orientation toward the other, these translatory peregrinations give force to the testimonial impetus in Levinas' work. As we recall, when Levinas was trying to explain why he did not write directly about the Shoah, he also enjoined his readers to listen to the inextinguishable cries that "echo and echo across eternity" ("Loving the Torah" 81, emphasis mine). After the Shoah, we can hear the same ethical injunction to bear witness to the voices of the past in Benjamin's question from "On the Concept of History": "Do we not, ourselves, feel a faint breath of the air in which people of yesterday lived? Do not the voices to which we lend our ears carry an echo of voices now extinguished?" (quoted in Didi-Huberman 170). Here again the recurrent metaphor of the echo brings forth the weight of the testimonial imperative.
The other's suffering is "useless suffering," inconvertible into meaning and impossible to appropriate or explain, not even, as Levinas argues (after Fackenheim), in terms of theodicy. Yet this absolute uselessness does acquire an ethical significance as "the suffering in me for the unjustifiable suffering of the other," which is a plea that elicits the self in its primordial and nonreciprocal responsibility (Levinas, "Useless Suffering" 94) . Does it matter, however, in what national language the victims uttered their last cry, whether the victims of the Shoah or the victims of any violence, of "the same hatred of the other man"? Levinas himself admits, in response to Philippe Nemo's questions about the genesis of his philosophical project, that thinking "probably begins through traumatisms or gropings to which one does not even know how to give a verbal form" (Ethics and Infinity 21, emphasis mine). Although he refused or perhaps was not able to "give a verbal form" to his own sense of alienation from language, this estrangement may have been a traumatic kernel which, perhaps exactly because it remained disarticulated, deeply informed Levinas' thinking about language and in fact his entire philosophical endeavour. Here Heidegger's supreme valorization of silence as the most authentic moment in a dialogue "from house to house" might also illuminate Levinas' own silence, even though Levinas, appalled by the German philosopher's silence of indifference, would not have granted Heidegger that insight. The mainstay of Levinas' project is the thesis that a subject is primarily a witness to another human being, for whom he is always responsible. Behind that project stands an injunction that a philosopher bear witness to atrocity since he is always obligated by another's suffering, and it is for ethical reasons that Levinas disengaged himself from thematizing that suffering. If Benjamin postulates a task for a translator that, under scrutiny, has been revealed as an ethical task, Levinas enjoins us to radically recalibrate the task of the philosopher in ethical terms, as testimony to the glory of the Infinite. Yet this philosophical witness might be rooted in the philosopher's stunned silence about the loss of his linguistic community, in the "ensilenced word" (das erschwiegene Wort) (Celan 79 ) that also
